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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses how the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) African bias has affected the 
judicial system in Africa at regional and international levels. First, the current literature on the 
ICC’s African bias and the African judicial system will be reviewed. Next, it will be analysed 
why the African Union (AU) and its Member States see the ICC as biased against Africa. Then 
it will be analysed what the AU’s judicial response is to the ICC’s African bias and how this 
response seeks to interpret international criminal law. Based on these reviews and analyses, this 
research concludes that the ICC’s African bias has affected the judicial system in Africa at 
regional and international levels by creating a continental human rights and criminal court that 
has jurisdiction over international criminal law. This research ends with the observation that 
the African Court on Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR) is created to replace 
the ICC as both Courts have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide 
and the crime of aggression. However, the replacement of the ICC could create an extra layer 
between Africa and the ICC, once the relationship and hierarchy between the two Courts are 
established. 
 
Key words: International Criminal Court (ICC), African bias, African Union (AU), 
Malabo Protocol, African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Right (ACJHPR)  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a milestone within the global criminal justice 
system because it is the first criminal court that has jurisdiction over individuals for the most 
serious crimes of international concern. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) argues that the ICC is the 
centrepiece of the international criminal justice system as the ICC is a permanent court with a 
mandate that can prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and 
the crime of aggression (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998). The ICC 
came into being in July 2002 after 60 countries had either ratified or acceded to the Rome 
Statute (Schabas, 2011). African countries in particular played an important part in the 
realisation of the ICC, as they were among the first countries that ratified and acceded to the 
Statute (Schabas, 2011). Additionally, Cole (2013) points out that with its 33 State Parties to 
the Rome Statute, Africa has the biggest regional representation to the Statute.  
Niang (2017, p. 616) holds that the African countries’ enthusiasm to join the Rome 
Statute was accompanied by “an unprecedented hope for justice.” However, over time, their 
enthusiasm, and especially the enthusiasm of the African Union (AU), towards the ICC 
diminished because African leaders became the prime suspect in most of the ICC’s 
investigations (Iommi, 2020). Iommi (2020) points out that nine of the eleven formal 
investigations opened by the ICC concern Africans, which has attracted criticism from the AU 
and its Member States saying that the ICC has a bias against Africa. The AU’s criticism became 
more vigorous when the ICC issued arrest warrants against several African leaders such as the 
former Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, the former Ivorian President 
Laurent Gbagbo, the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi and the current President of 
Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta in the late 2000s and the early 2010s (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). The 
AU’s criticism soon turned into an official policy of non-cooperation with the ICC and the 
adoption of the Malabo Protocol. This Protocol envisions the setup of the yet to be operational 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR). The AU has also 
continuously encouraged for its Member States to withdraw from the Rome Statute (Jeangène 
Vilmer, 2016; Ssensenyonjo, 2018; Iommi, 2020).  
In addition to the serious international concerns about a possible mass withdrawal from 
African State Parties to the Rome Statute from the Rome Statute, the Malabo Protocol raises 
several other concerns. An Amnesty International report (2017) demonstrates that these 
concerns are mainly of a legal and institutional nature, highlighting that it is unclear whether 
the Malabo Protocol is to be made operational to replace the ICC, to create an extra judicial 
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layer between Africa and the ICC or to strengthen the African judicial system. Additionally, it 
is unclear if the ICC’s African bias has had any effect on the creation of the Malabo Protocol. 
Hence, the question that this thesis raises is: “How has the ICC’s African bias affected the 
judicial system in Africa at regional and international levels?” 
This research is relevant because the AU acts as a representative for its 54 Member 
States which gives it a substantial amount of influence. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) notes that the 
AU’s criticism on the ICC’s preliminary focus on Africa has increased over the last ten years. 
Jeangène Vilmer (2016) continues to argue that the increase in the AU’s criticism on the ICC’s 
focus on African countries can have far-reaching consequences because as the continent’s 
institutional voice, the AU has considerable influence in Africa which can lead to the AU’s 
anti-ICC sentiments to become the dominant view throughout the continent. Furthermore, the 
AU’s anti-ICC sentiments can weaken the ICC’s position and influence in the international 
criminal justice system. This in turn can weaken the ICC’s contribution in the fight against 
impunity in Africa and elsewhere (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). Additionally, this research is 
relevant because the African judicial system is still developing, which might make it vulnerable 
to external influences. Fon (2019) points out that across Africa “[i]nternational courts and 
tribunals have emerged and flourished at both regional and international levels [but] there is 
still much to be done in terms of reconciling the existing regional and continental judicial 
institutions to form a hierarchical structure, clarifying the jurisdiction of each judicial body and 
ensuring the enforceability of decisions.” (p. 494).  
This thesis hypothesises that the ICC’s African bias has affected the judicial system in 
Africa at regional and international levels in terms of overreach, given that the African judicial 
system is not yet properly integrated, the goal of establishing the ACJHPR and its relationship 
with the ICC are unclear and the fact that Africa does not yet have a court with a mandate to 
prosecute international crimes and therefore lacks the experience and the know-how 
(Ssenyonjo, 2018),  In other words, the ICC’s African bias has prompted the AU to create a 
court in which Africans are tried by Africans for violations of serious crimes of international 
concern while Africa’s judicial system at regional and international levels are not yet up for the 
task.  
In this thesis, the term African bias refers to the assumed negative image that the ICC 
has of some African countries, and to a larger extent, of Africa as a whole. More importantly, 
the term refers to the assumption that in the ICC’s eyes, the AU and several of its Member 
States prolong the war against impunity instead of contributing to its end. Furthermore in this 
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thesis, the term African judicial system refers to the judicial system that is currently in place in 
Africa on regional and international levels.  
In the following sections, I review the literature on the ICC’s African bias and the 
African judicial system and discuss the theories and the methodology that are used in this thesis. 
 
1.2 Literature review  
This section reviews the relevant academic literature on the ICC’s bias towards Africa 
and the relevant literature on the African judicial system. 
 
The ICC’s African bias 
The notion of an autonomous international court without political ties was met with 
great support from many countries across Africa and from the AU (Sibiya & Nel, 2017). 
However, Sibiya & Nel (2017) argue that in spite of this great support, it has become clear in 
the past decade that the AU and several African states have become hostile towards the ICC.  
Imoedemhe (2015) and Jeangène Vilmer (2016) argue that the AU and several African 
countries became more opposed towards the ICC after the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. Nonetheless, Imoedemhe (2015) 
suggests that it is not the UNSC’s referral but the decision of the ICC’s Prosecutor to open an 
investigation into the situation in Sudan, and in addition to that, the issuance of the two arrest 
warrants against former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir that actually caused the change in 
behaviour. At that point, in the Court’s short history, no former or current head of state of a 
State Party to the Rome Statute had been indicted, let alone a sitting head of state from a Non-
State Party. The indictments of Omar al-Bashir changed that and therefore caused the change 
in behaviour of the AU and several African states towards the ICC. 
The AU’s and the several African countries’ change in behaviour is reflected in their 
current relationship with the ICC. Imoedemhe (2015) stresses that the relationship between the 
ICC and the AU was cordial but that this all changed when the ICC’s Prosecutor issued the 
arrest warrants for Omar al-Bashir. Imoedemhe (2015) highlights that the arrest warrants caused 
tensions in the relationship between the ICC and the AU. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) adds that 
after the two arrest warrants “a post-colonial, pan-African anti-ICC rhetoric emerged” (p. 
1321). This rhetoric stipulates, among other things, that the ICC is an institution that only 
prosecutes Africans and can be viewed as an endeavour of the West to bring their former 
colonies under their control again. This rhetoric spread and became stronger after the ICC’s 
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Prosecutor issued arrest warrants for the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi and for the 
current President and the Vice-President of Kenya. 
The relationship between the AU and the ICC suffered another setback when the AU 
issued an official call of non-cooperation with the ICC. The AU hopes that this strategy will 
deter its Member States from cooperating with the ICC in the capture of Omar al-Bashir. The 
AU’s call for non-cooperation put the 33 AU Member States that are also State Parties to the 
Rome Statute in a difficult position. The issuance of the non-cooperation strategy forces them 
to make a decision between adhering to the AU and their obligations under the Rome Statute. 
Imoedemhe (2015) argues that some of these State Parties seem to be more committed to their 
AU membership than to their obligations under the Rome Statute as Omar al-Bashir was able 
to travel freely on the territories of several African State Parties without being captured and 
transferred to the premises of the ICC. According to Cole (2013), the decision to adhere to the 
AU’s call of non-cooperation jeopardises the position of the ICC as the ICC is reliant on the 
assistance of its State Parties for the investigation, capture and prosecution of suspects.  
The relationship between the AU and the ICC suffered another setback when the AU 
encouraged its Member States to withdraw from the Rome Statute and adopted the official 
Withdrawal Strategy in 2017 (Assembly of the Union, 2017). This Strategy can be seen as an 
attempt to weaken the position of the ICC, much like the non-cooperation strategy. The AU 
appeared to be successful as three African State Parties to the Rome Statute issued notifications 
of withdrawal from the Statute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) according 
to Article 127 of the Statute in 2016 (Ssenyonjo, 2018). However, Ssenyonjo (2018) remarks 
that apart from these three official notifications of withdrawal and the numerous threats of AU 
Member States to withdraw from the Rome Statute, Burundi is the first and thus far only AU 
Member State and State Party to the Rome Statute that withdrew itself from the Statute. 
Although the AU’s Withdrawal Strategy does have a certain effect on its Member States, this 
effect does not result in the anticipated withdrawal from the Rome Statute.   
 
The African judicial system 
Even though a mass withdrawal from African State Parties to the Rome Statute has not 
yet taken place, it does pose the question of what happens next in the African judicial system 
and if it has an alternative for the ICC (Fon, 2019).  
The Malabo Protocol, adopted in 2014, seems to provide one answer to the question if 
the African judicial system has an alternative for the ICC. The Protocol widens the mandate of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to include criminal jurisdiction over 
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the most serious international crimes committed in the whole of Africa (Nimigan, 2019; 
Murungu, 2011). After the successful ratification of the Malabo Protocol, the ACJHR will 
transform into the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR).  
Although the Malabo Protocol appears to be an appealing alternative to the ICC, there 
are some concerns regarding this Protocol. One concern is its scope. Nimigan (2019) points out 
that the scope of the Protocol is tremendous and far greater than any other international criminal 
justice mechanism on earth. An Amnesty International report on the Malabo Protocol (2017) 
underlines that with a jurisdiction covering three areas of international law, it is not certain if 
the ACJHPR is able to live up to the expectations set out in the Protocol. Additionally, the 
Report (2017) expresses worries about whether the ACJHPR’s tremendous jurisdiction 
provides the Court with the capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver on its mandate. 
Ssenyonjo (2018) explains that these worries are justified because Africa has not yet had a court 
with a mandate that covers international crimes and therefore lacks the experience and the 
required knowledge.  
Another concern is the impossibility of lifting the immunity of heads of state or 
government. Whereas the Rome Statute allows for the lifting of this kind of immunity based on 
Article 27 of the Statute, the Malabo Protocol does not. Article 46Abis of the Protocol reads 
that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other 
senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure in office” (Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
2014, p. 38). In essence, Article 46Abis perpetuates the culture of impunity for African leaders 
who commit the most serious crimes of international law without any legal consequences 
(Nimigan, 2019), depriving the victims of these crimes of any kind of justice. Given the fact 
that courts of justice and criminal courts are established to fight crime and the war against 
impunity, questions have been raised about whether the Malabo Protocol is an appealing 
alternative. Moreover, it is important to question how the ACJHPR, which is based on the 
Malabo Protocol, fits into the African judicial system.  
How the ACJHPR fits into the African judicial system might be ambiguous because the 
African judicial system is still an uncompleted system. Fon (2019) states that “while the 
patchwork of judicial institutions does not necessarily make for the existence of a judicial 
system, it can also not be argued that the infrastructure for an African judicial system is non-
existent” (p. 494). Indeed, international courts and tribunals have arisen and thrived in Africa 
at both regional and continental levels, laying the groundwork for an African judicial system 
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(Fon, 2019). However, Fon (2019) points out that these regional and international courts have 
emerged and thrived without a clear understanding of the hierarchy between courts, which 
courts have jurisdiction over what crime(s) and whether court decisions are enforceable. This 
suggests that the will for an integrated, functioning and hierarchical judicial system is there, but 
that it is in a need for improvement and further development of this system.   
 
1.3 Research design 
International law and the international justice system  
The ICC is the centrepiece of the international criminal justice system because it is the 
only court that has permanent jurisdiction over the core crimes of international criminal law 
(Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). However, the ICC’s jurisdiction appears not to be completely 
universal as the majority of the cases before the Court’s Chambers involve either African 
nationals or African states. The ICC’s primary focus on Africa has led to frustrations and 
concerns among African states and within the AU as violations of the “most serious crimes of 
international concern” also happen in other parts of the world, such as Iraq (Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 1998). Yet, the ICC does not investigate these cases nor does 
it receive such case referrals from the UNSC (Imoedemhe, 2015; Ba, 2017). Regardless of the 
fact that influential and populated countries such the United States and Russia are not State 
Parties to the Rome Statute (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016), Ba (2017) argues that the ICC does not 
investigate cases wherein these countries are the alleged perpetrators because the international 
criminal justice system, in which the ICC is operative, sanctifies that the West is incapable of 
committing criminal acts.  
There is a long colonial genealogy to international law that has been discussed in several 
works, to which the ICC is not an exception (Anghie, 2006; Grovogui, 1998; Koksennemmi, 
2002; Chimni, 2007; Ba, 2017; Lingaas, 2019). The idea that the West is invincible is present 
since the international justice system’s inception, as international law has a very strong 
European influence (Anghie, 2006). Verzijl (1968) states that “now there is one truth that is not 
open to denial or even to doubt, namely that the actual body of international law, as it stands 
today, not only is the product of the conscious activity of the European mind, but also has drawn 
its vital essence from a common source of beliefs, and in both these aspects it is mainly of 
Western European origin” (p. 435-436). From Verzijl’s point of view, international law 
harbours a series of principles and doctrines that originated from Europe, stemming from 
European history and experience that overtime stretched out to non-European countries outside 
of the borders of European international law (Anghie, 2006).   
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Besides the strong European influence, international law developed along the concept 
that different stages of its history are formed by distinctive styles of jurisprudence (Anghie, 
2006). The first distinctive style of jurisprudence is naturalism, which states that universal 
international law originates from human reason and applies to all races. The second distinctive 
style is positivism which holds that a state can only be held accountable to rules to which it has 
agreed to (Anghie, 2006; Ba, 2017). Both styles remain present in today’s international justice 
system but, according to Anghie (2006), view society, the concept of law and the international 
system very differently. Positivism, for example, divides the world in civilised and uncivilised 
states with which its maintains a gap between the West and the non-West. Anghie (2006) 
identifies this as the dynamic of difference in which “international law posits a gap, a difference 
between the European and non-European cultures and peoples, the former being characterised, 
broadly, as civilised and the latter as uncivilised” (Anghie, 2006, p. 742). 
The dynamic of difference arises when international law tries to create a universal 
system of order among institutions seen as being part of different cultural systems (Anghie, 
2006). Anghie (1999) argues that international law is in principle universal as it applies to all 
countries irrespective of their distinctive cultures, political organisations and belief systems. In 
other words, international law can be viewed as a manner that involved countries use to 
maintain their relations with each other (Anghie, 1999). However, as several scholars including 
Anghie (1999) point out, the universality of international law, which implies that it is 
omnipresent and involves everyone, is a relatively new phenomenon. Although international 
law exists everywhere and involves everyone, it does not regard everyone as alike or equal. 
Indeed, the West had colonised the majority of the Pacific, Asia and Africa before the start of 
the Second World War or had put them under European supervision (Ba, 2017). This not only 
meant that the colonised countries became part of a law system that was distinctively European 
but it also meant that they were regarded as inferior. The colonised countries and the territories 
under European supervision were not in a position to make alterations to the established 
international law nor were they in a position to have international law acknowledge their point 
of view. This left them vulnerable to their colonisers and their strong influence on international 
law. This pattern, according to Ba (2017), resembles the positivist point of view of international 
law which is still present in today’s international justice system.  
  
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
Another point of view that is present in today’s international justice system is that of 
TWAIL. TWAIL was founded in the 1990s when a few law students from Harvard Law School 
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grouped together to debate whether it was possible to create a third world approach to 
international law and what the key characteristics of such an approach could be (Eslava, 2019). 
A key characteristic of TWAIL is that the third world is inadequately represented in 
international law and the international justice system. Gathii (2019) underlines that it has long 
been argued by third world leaders and TWAIL scholars that international law in itself is not 
international as it does not include the sensibilities, voices and concerns of particularly non-
European people. TWAIL therefore rejects, modifies and challenges “some of the existing 
treaties, customs and general principles of international law developed by the former world 
community which was dominated by the stronger ‘civilised’ nations of the world” (Gathii, 
2019, p. 7).  
In essence, TWAIL scholars attempt to write and re-write international law from a third 
world perspective (Gathii, 2019). With this attempt, TWAIL scholars criticise the universality 
of international law and simultaneously hope to create a balance between the first and the third 
world within the international justice system (Gathii, 2019). Furthermore, Gathii (2019) argues 
that TWAIL scholars discard the European-based ideas of international law that do not take 
responsibility for the history of inferior groups within it and its lasting consequences such as 
poverty. Hence, TWAIL resembles a transformative and adversarial set of ideas and promises 
that reshape the international justice system (Gathii, 2019).   
 
The ICC, international law and the international justice system 
The ICC has the opportunity to change the narrative of international law and to include 
the perspectives of third world countries because it is the centrepiece of the international 
criminal justice system and because the majority of the State Parties to the Rome Statute are 
third world countries (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016; International Criminal Court, n.d.). Based on the 
ICC’s cases, however, it can be argued that the ICC has not yet taken this opportunity and 
therefore remains within the Eurocentric view of international criminal law. Hence, this thesis 
is approached from an international law and TWAIL perspective.   
 
1.4 Methodology 
Research method and sources  
This thesis employs a qualitative research method. The main focus of this thesis is to 
conduct legal research. The Bodleian Libraries (n.d.), that are associated with the University of 
Oxford, state that there is no universal path for conducting legal research. However, the 
Bodleian Librarians (n.d.) do argue that there are eight steps that need to be taken into account 
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when conducting legal research. These steps are to identify the scope of the legal question, to 
start the research by consulting a secondary source, to identify the relevant statutes, to identify 
the cases that are up to date for specific facts, to use databases and digests to find more cases, 
to know that the used authority is still valid, to search other online sources to close any gaps in 
the research and lastly, to document the taken research trail. 
In line with conducting legal research, this thesis uses legal texts as primary sources. 
This thesis also uses political texts as primary sources. It relies on academic articles for 
secondary sources.   
When doing research, Fischer and Julsing (2007) stress that it is necessary that the 
conducted research is reliable and that it has a decent score on validity. This thesis is considered 
reliable because it is very likely that other researches will come to the same conclusion(s) when 
the same or similar sources are used. The findings of this thesis cannot be generalised to other 
judicial systems, particularly those in Europe, for two reasons. The first reason is that the ICC, 
for instance, is not accused of being biased against Europe or the European Union (EU) by 
individual European states, the EU or its Member States. On the contrast, the ICC enjoys 
considerable support from the EU Member States as well as from non-EU Member States 
(European Union, 2006; Eneström, 2019). The second reason is that the African judicial system 
cannot be compared to other judicial systems. This is because the African judicial system is in 
its developing stage whereas other judicial systems, such as the EU’s judicial system, are fully 
developed (Fon, 2019).  
 
1.5 Chapter scheme 
This chapter introduced the topic of this thesis, reviewed the relevant academic literature 
on the ICC’s African bias and Africa’s judicial system at the regional and international level 
and discussed the theories and the methodology that are used in this thesis. Chapter two will 
analyse in depth why the AU and its Member States see the ICC as being biased against Africa. 
Chapter three will analyse what the AU’s judicial response is to the ICC’s African bias and how 
this response seeks to interpret international criminal law. Chapter four will answer the research 
question and will provide the reader with recommendations for further research.  
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Chapter 2 The ICC’s African Bias 
            2.1 Introduction  
The Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court was adopted in 1998 after talks 
about a permanent criminal court emerged a few years earlier (Schabas, 2011). Cole (2013) 
highlights that Africa’s call for the creation of a permanent criminal court came from the highest 
levels of the continent’s leadership. These calls led to the adoption of the Dakar Declaration for 
the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (Cole, 2013). The Declaration, inter alia, 
states that the African national legal systems have generally failed to meet the conditions to 
hold perpetrators accountable for gross violations of international law, which amplifies the need 
to ratify and accede to the Rome Statute (Cole, 2013). In the months following the adoption of 
the Declaration, many African states ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute. Next to the 
commitment of individual African states to fight the war against impunity by adhering to the 
Rome Statute, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the AU, pledged 
that it would cooperate with the relevant institutions set to prosecute perpetrators as it condemns 
the perpetration of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on African soil (Cole, 
2013). Roughly ten years after the adoption of the Declaration, the then President of the ICC, 
Sang-Hyun, acknowledged the vital role that African states played in the establishment of the 
ICC and stated that without their support the Rome Statute “would have never been adopted” 
(Ssenyonjo, 2013, p. 386). Indeed, the African states led the way in signing up to the Rome 
Statute (Cole, 2013).  
Despite the vital role that African states have played in the creation of the Rome Statute 
and the AU’s pledge to cooperate with the relevant institutions to fight the war against impunity, 
both the AU and their Member States have in recent years reconsidered their commitments to 
the ICC due to its strong presence in Africa. The AU has criticised the ICC for its strong 
presence in Africa. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the reasons for the AU’s criticism 
that the ICC is biased against Africa.   
 
2.2 The ICC’s bias against Africa  
The primary reason that the AU sees the ICC as biased against Africa seems to be the 
notion that the ICC only prosecutes Africans while it does not prosecute other individuals who 
have committed atrocities in other parts of the world (Imoedemhe, 2015; Jeangène Vilmer, 
2016; Niang, 2017; Sibiya & Nel, 2017). The fact that the ICC’s Prosecutor opened three new 
investigations in Africa within a time period of six years without opening investigations in other 
parts of the world where atrocities have happened seems to confirm the AU’s beliefs. With 
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three new cases in Africa, Darfur in 2005 and Libya and Kenya in 2011, on top of the cases that 
the ICC was already investigating in Africa, criticism about the ICC’s modus operandi and 
allegations that the ICC is biased against Africa started to emerge in the official discourse of 
the AU and its Member States (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). Furthermore, the then President of the 
AU’s Commission, Jean Ping, commented in 2009 that “international justice seems to be 
applying its fight against impunity only to Africa as if nothing were happening elsewhere – in 
Iraq, Gaza, Colombia or in the Caucasus” (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016, p. 1321).  Hence, the ICC 
has been critiqued for its Eurocentrism in application of international law. Indeed, until January 
2016 all the cases pending before the ICC concerned African states (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). 
In total, ten out of the thirteen ICC’s current cases concern African countries with two more 
African cases under the Court’s preliminary examinations. These ten cases are Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Central African Republic, the Republic of 
Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Central African Republic II and Burundi. Nigeria and 
Guinea are the two African countries that are under the Court’s preliminary examinations 
(International Criminal Court, n.d.).  
While the majority of cases that are currently under the ICC’s investigation concern 
African states, it is important to have a closer look at these ten cases. Upon further investigation, 
it becomes clear that five of the ten cases were referred to the ICC’s Prosecutor by their African 
states’ respective governments. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) explains that these cases were referred 
to the ICC’s Prosecutor, because the governments of Uganda, the DRC, the Central African 
Republic and Mali lacked the political will or ability to prosecute these individuals themselves. 
The Central African Republic self-referred twice. With the self-referrals, the Ugandan, 
Congolese, Central African Republican and Malian governments followed the ICC’s principle 
of complementarity. This principle states that the ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction where 
the national legal systems fail to do so, which includes situations where it appears that the 
government in question acts upon the crimes committed but in reality lacks the ability or the 
willingness to prosecute (ICC-OTP, 2003). Imoedemhe (2015) argues that the self-referrals 
demonstrate the support and trust that the governments of Uganda, the DRC, the Central African 
Republic and Mali have in the ICC, contradicting the notion that the ICC is biased against 
Africa. Furthermore, on closer inspection of the ten African cases referred to the Prosecutor of 
the ICC, it becomes clear that the UNSC referred two African cases (International Criminal 
Court, n.d.). The UNSC, based on Article 13 of the Rome Statute, is able to refer cases to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC. The fact that this Article enables the UNSC to refer cases to the ICC’s 
Prosecutor is a point of contention, given that three of the five permanent members of the UNSC 
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are not State Parties to the Rome Statute and have the power to veto certain case referrals, such 
as Syria (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016; Imoedemhe, 2015). The UNSC’s veto power limits the ICC’s 
abilities to fight the war against impunity. 
Thus, there are only three cases concerning Africa that the ICC’s Prosecutor opened on 
their own: Kenya in 2010, Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and Burundi in 2017. Based on this, 
Imoedemhe (2015) underlines that even though the ICC is perceived to have an inappropriate 
fixation on Africa, it does not necessarily mean that the ICC is biased against Africa. Sibiya 
and Nel (2017) add that with the investigation in Georgia and the situations in Colombia, 
Iraq/United Kingdom, Palestine and Ukraine under the Court’s preliminary examinations, the 
ICC shows its preparedness to investigate cases outside Africa. Further, the Prosecutor of the 
ICC opened investigations in Bangladesh/Myanmar in November 2019 and in Afghanistan in 
March 2020. Two situations in Venezuela from 2017 and 2020 respectively have been added 
to the cases under the Court’s preliminary investigations (International Criminal Court, n.d.) 
Hence, the accusations of the ICC’s bias against Africa cannot be fully justified. If the ICC is 
indeed investigating cases outside Africa and brings non-African cases under its preliminary 
examinations, why does the AU insist that the ICC exclusively targets Africans? 
One reason is that in the first 14 years of the ICC’s existence, the Court has only 
investigated cases that concern African nationals or African states. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) and 
Sibiya and Nel (2017) confirm that up to January 2016 all the cases under the ICC’s 
investigation were African. Another reason is that since the Court’s establishment, all suspected 
individuals of whom the ICC has issued arrest warrants against have been Africans (Sibiya & 
Nel, 2017). The AU’s reasons show that the international justice system acts disproportionate 
to the African continent as alleged crimes of western nations or upcoming nations, such as 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea,  are not investigated. Griffiths (2012) underscores that 
international criminal law as executed today is disproportionate, because it holds an untold truth 
that certain individuals, from certain countries of origin will never find themselves summoned 
before an international court or tribunal facing justice for the crimes committed. Additionally, 
the AU’s reasons show that the ICC’s jurisdiction is indeed not entirely universal as the Court 
is largely focused on the crimes committed in Africa. As a result of this, Imoedemhe (2015) 
argues that Africans or African states are depicted as primarily responsible for all of humanity’s 
inhumanity.  
This depiction strengthens the dynamic of difference, which is present in the positivist 
view on international criminal law and which characterises Europeans as civilised and non-
Europeans as uncivilised (Anghie, 2006). Moreover, this depiction, just as the international 
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justice system’s disproportionateness, sends the message that when a person is black or of 
African descent and has committed a crime, it is likely that this person will face justice whereas 
a white person or a person of European descent that has committed a crime is less likely to do 
so. Grovogui (1996) argues that this is due to the belief, that in the international justice system, 
western nations are not able to commit crimes that are of serious international concern. Overall, 
while it seems that the ICC has lately taken the criticism of being biased against Africans 
seriously, there are still no western leaders under the ICC’s legal scan.  
 
2.3 The AU and the ICC’s African bias  
The previous section has set out the reasons why the AU regards the ICC as biased 
against Africa and how far that criticism is justified. This section examines how the AU and its 
Member States respond to the ICC’s African bias.  
 
In response to the ICC’s focus on Africa, African leaders and commentators have termed 
the institution as neo-colonial. This characterisation of the ICC had become particularly salient 
in the aftermath of the issued arrest warrants for the former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
and subsequently the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, the former Ivorian President 
Laurent Gbagbo and the current President and Vice-President of Kenya (Jeangène Vilmer, 
2016; Iommi, 2020). The ICC is accused of practising ‘white justice’ and acting as an African 
Criminal Court (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). The Gambian Information Minister Sheriff Bojang 
accused the ICC of being “an International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation 
of people of colour and especially Africans” (O’Grady, 2016, p. 1). Similarly, the Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame argued that “with [the] ICC all the injustices of the past including 
colonialism, imperialism, keep coming back in different forms. They control you. As long as 
you are poor, weak there is always some rope to hang you. [The] ICC is made for Africans and 
poor countries” (Imoedemhe, 2015, p. 82).  
The anti-ICC rhetoric underlines that Africa and other third world countries remain 
vulnerable to powerful western nations because these nations keep dominating the international 
justice system. Additionally, western nations’ mode of thinking, which can be regarded as 
positivist, maintains to prevail in international criminal law. In this point of view, western 
nations are viewed as civilised whereas non-western nations are seen as uncivilised (Anghie, 
2016; Ba, 2017). Niang (2017) points out that the latter is reflected in the UNSC’s modus 
operandi, as its members dismiss the notion that their citizens can be summoned before the ICC. 
Additionally, Sibiya and Nel (2017) add that the African nations are singled out because the 
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ICC cannot afford to lose its largest financial supports from non-African nations and African 
nations do not have the same economic and diplomatic powers than western nations.  
This critique became vociferous after the ICC’s Prosecutor issued two arrest warrants 
against Omar al-Bashir. Interestingly, at the time of the issuance of the arrest warrants against 
al-Bashir, the ICC already had captured a number of suspects, among them Germain Katanga, 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. The ICC had also 
issued arrest warrants against others, all of whom were Africans. However, neither the AU nor 
its Member States protested against these arrest warrants or accused the ICC of being biased 
against Africa (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). Jeangène Vilmer (2016) argues that the AU’s protests 
and its anti-ICC rhetoric were caused exclusively by the arrest warrants for al-Bashir, which 
demonstrates that the AU and its Member States have no issues with the ICC indicting Africans. 
Jeangène Vilmer (2016) stresses that the AU and its Member States have issues with the ICC 
indicting powerful Africans, and in particular, heads of state and seniors state officials. This 
leads to a line of reasoning where the ICC is not only biased against Africa, but to a certain 
extent the AU too.  
The withdrawal strategy is another way the AU and its Member States responded to the 
ICC being biased against Africa. The AU altered its Open-Ended Committee on the ICC to 
create a comprehensive strategy in early 2016, which included the possibility to withdraw from 
the Rome Statute. With this alteration, the AU signalled to the ICC that it no longer supported 
the Court. More importantly, the AU’s alteration to the Open-Ended Committee also signalled 
to its Member States that they could withdraw from the Rome Statute if they so desired. A 
possible mass withdrawal would not only undermine the legitimacy of the ICC but also threaten 
the Court’s existence.  
According to Jeangène Vilmer (2016), there are few reasons why a mass withdrawal has 
not yet taken place. The first reason is that the AU cannot force its Members to withdraw as 
that decision needs to be taken by their respective governments. As Nigeria’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Dr Clement Aduku, stated, “[The] AU, which was not a party to 
the Rome Statute that established the court, should not be developing a strategy for a collective 
withdrawal for something that each country entered into individually” (Omorogbe, 2019, p. 
296). Besides, AU Member States do not speak with one voice in the withdrawal debate. 
Omorogbe (2019) points out that 16 AU Member States immediately expressed their concerns 
about the strategy. Other AU Member States have threatened to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute, some have issued official notifications of withdrawal and others have joined the ICC 
by ratifying and acceding to the Rome Statute (Jeangène Vilmer, 2016). The Seychelles, 
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Tunisia, Cape Verde and Côte d’Ivoire respectively ratified the Rome Statute in 2010, 2011 and 
in 2013 (Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, n.d.). The second reason why a mass 
withdrawal has not yet taken place is that although many AU Member States remain hostile 
towards to the ICC, this does not necessarily mean that they want to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute. Jeangène Vilmer (2016) highlights that the majority of the AU Member States clearly 
separate their criticism of the ICC from a possible withdrawal of the Rome Statute.   
The clear differentiation between criticising the ICC and withdrawing from the Rome 
Statute seems to explain why many AU Member States have continuously threatened to 
withdraw but have not issued official notifications of withdrawal to the Secretary-General of 
the UN. In contrast, Burundi, South Africa and The Gambia did issue official notifications of 
withdrawal. However, the Gambian and South African notifications were revoked due to a 
change in the Gambian government and a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
respectively. Burundi did not revoke its official notification of withdrawal and therefore is the 
first AU Member State and African State Party to the Rome Statute to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute (Ssenyonjo, 2018). According to Iommi (2020), Burundi based its decision to leave the 
Rome Statute on the grounds that the ICC was displaying unfair behaviour towards its African 
State Parties. Burundi was of the opinion that the ICC, especially focused on African countries 
in its investigations and that it has not been successful in understanding regional issues (Iommi, 
2020). Although the AU welcomed Burundi’s decision to leave the Rome Statute, Jeangène 
Vilmer (2016), in counter to Iommi (2020), argues that Burundi did not withdraw from the 
Rome Statute because of the AU’s Withdrawal Strategy but because its late President wanted 
to avoid being investigated by the ICC’s Prosecutor. Burundi was set under the ICC’s 
preliminary investigations in April 2016 almost a year after late Burundian President Pierre 
Nkurunziza announced that he would run for an unconstitutional third term, putting Burundi in 
a political and humanitarian crisis (International Criminal Court, n.d.). The ICC’s Prosecutor 
opened an investigation two days before the withdrawal became effective, maintaining the legal 
possibility to uphold justice within and outside Burundi (International Criminal Court, n.d.). In 
short, the reservations of a large number of AU Member States about the AU’s Withdrawal 
Strategy, the continuous division among the AU Member States about this issue and the fact 
that ultimately only one AU Member State has withdrawn from the Rome Statute displays that 
the AU’s Withdrawal Strategy is ineffective and has little support among its Member States 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse why the AU sees the ICC as biased against Africa. 
The AU’s primary reason for seeing the ICC as biased against Africa is because the ICC only 
targets Africans. As all the cases before the ICC’s Chambers are African, one may conclude 
that the AU is correct. However, when looking at the cases more closely, one sees that five 
African cases were self-referrals by their respective governments, two African cases were 
UNSC referrals and the ICC’s Prosecutor only opened three African cases on their own 
initiative. Additionally, the Prosecutor of the ICC has also opened investigations in three non-
African states. These facts weaken the AU’s argument that the ICC only targets Africans. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the first 14 years of the Court’s existence, it has solely 
dealt with African cases, which support the conclusion that the ICC has an inappropriate 
fixation on Africa. This chapter also supports the conclusion that the ICC maintains a 
Eurocentric view on international criminal law as it does not investigate cases that concern 
western or first world states. The ICC’s Eurocentric view on international criminal law is partly 
upheld by the system it operates in, partly by the ICC’s largest non-African financial supporters 
and partly by the influence of the UNSC. 
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Chapter 3 The Malabo Protocol  
3.1 Introduction  
Although Africa gained its independence from Europe in the 20th century, Europe’s 
influence in and over Africa remains present today. An area where Europe’s influence remains 
present is in Africa’s criminal legal system and in the way that suspected African individuals, 
especially if these individuals are heads of state or government and senior state officials are 
held accountable for purportedly committed crimes (Murungu, 2011). Murungu (2011) argues 
that Europe instituted many proceedings against African senior state officials or African 
incumbents on European soil, frustrating the AU and the Member States involved.  
France has frequently indicted and prosecuted African heads of state or government and 
senior state officials in its domestic courts. In 2005, France indicted the former President of 
Mauritania, Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya. In 2007, a French judge indicted Rwandan 
military as well as state officials for their suspected participation in the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame was exempted from these arrest warrants as he 
enjoys immunity from prosecution as head of state. Two years later, France issued arrest 
warrants against the current Presidents of Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo 
(Congo-Brazzaville), the former Presidents of Angola and Burkina Faso and the now late 
Gabonese President Omar Bongo, accusing them of corruption (Murungu, 2011).  
Like France, Belgium has also frequently indicted African heads of state or government 
and senior state officials. Belgium has issued arrest warrants against the former President of 
Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo and the current President of Rwanda. Additionally, Belgium 
issued an international arrest warrant against the then serving Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
DRC, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi. This case did not only cause diplomatic tensions between 
the DRC and Belgium but also led to a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
Arrest Warrant case (Murungu, 2011). The ICJ ruled in favour of the DRC (Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000 [Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium], n.d.). Murungu (2011) notes 
that some ICJ-judges on the Arrest Warrant case doubted the actual reason for the prosecution 
of African heads of state or government and senior state officials. Murungu (2011) continues 
to note that the separate opinions of judges Bula-Bula and Rezek, if observed carefully, could 
have had influenced a revolutionary idea in Africa against the prosecution of African heads of 
state or government and senior state officials in European jurisdictions. This idea would have 
been to provide the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) with an 
international criminal law section, but it was rejected by the AU (Omorogbe, 2019). Omorogbe 
(2019) points out that this idea resurfaced when the AU issued an official call of non-
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cooperation with the ICC in 2009. Furthermore, Omorogbe (2011) points out that after the 
ICC’s Prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the AU wondered 
how “Africa’s interest can be fully defended and protected in the international judicial system” 
(p. 292). Therefore, the first aim of this chapter is to analyse what the AU’s judicial response is 
to the ICC’s African bias. The second aim is to analyse how the AU’s judicial response seeks 
to interpret international criminal law. Before I analyse the aims of this chapter, I will first 
highlight Africa’s current judicial system at regional and international level. 
 
3.2 Africa’s regional and international legal system 
The Law of Lagos signals the birth of a human rights protection mechanism in Africa. 
The Law of Lagos was set up by African jurists in 1961, with which these jurists asked their 
governments to consider adopting an African Convention on Human Rights and the 
establishment of a court with suitable jurisdiction (Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016). It was not until 
1981 that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the then OAU adopted the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Human Rights Charter) (Nmehielle, 2014). 
The African Human Rights Charter entered into force in 1986 and on the basis of Article 30, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established. The Commission is 
charged with the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights and freedoms in Africa 
(African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1986). Ssenyonjo  and Nakitto (2016) 
point out that a Commission was created rather than a human rights court because then OAU’s 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government considered the creation of such a court 
‘premature’. However, the Assembly did acknowledge that the introduction of a human rights 
court in the future would be beneficial and should be introduced via an added protocol to the 
African Charter of Human Rights (Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016). The introduction of a human 
rights court came in 1998 when the OAU adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 1998). The ACHPR entered into force in 2004 and became operational 
two years later (Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998). Up to 2015, the only 
functioning continental human rights court present in Africa was the ACHPR (Ssenyonjo & 
Nakitto, 2016). Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) stress that this court only deals with human rights 
matters and not with criminal matters. Regional human rights courts in Africa are the Economic 
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Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) and the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) (Fon, 2019). 
The AU and its Member States have little experience with criminal courts and 
international criminal law because the AU nor its Member States have functioning criminal 
courts (Ssenyonjo, 2018). According to Nmehielle (2014), Africa’s closest experience with 
criminal courts and international criminal law are the two ad hoc tribunals that have been 
operating on African soil. The Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the UN to deal 
with the aftershock of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was 
created to deal with the severe crimes that were committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war 
(Nmehielle, 2014). Although, the ad hoc tribunals were operative in Africa, the AU or the AU 
Member States involved did not own the tribunals, nor were they responsible for their 
functioning (Nmehielle, 2014). Nmehielle (2014) argues that this changed when the AU 
established the African Extraordinary Chambers (AEC) for the trial of Hissène Habré in 2013. 
The Chambers were established in Senegal where former Chadian Pressident Hissène Habré 
was convicted for gross human rights violations (Nmehielle, 2014). Fon (2019) argues that next 
to the ACHPR, the AEC is a milestone in Africa’s judicial landscape because it marked the first 
time that a former African head of state was convicted for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes by an African judicial institution on African soil. With the AEC, the AU and its Member 
States demonstrate that Africa can be entrusted with a task of such importance. However, it 
should be noted that the creation, ratification and operationalisation of both human rights and 
criminal courts in Africa takes a considerable amount of time. Additionally, it should be noted 
that the political will to establish a human rights and criminal court and to submit to its 
jurisdiction is often lacking and that both are a reoccurring theme in Africa’s regional and 
international legal system.  
 
3.3 The Malabo Protocol 
The previous section highlighted Africa’s regional and international legal system. This 
section analyses what the AU’s judicial response is to the ICC’s African bias.  
 
The AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias is to provide the ACHPR with a 
criminal chamber that deals with international criminal law. The AU, as pointed out earlier, had 
rejected this idea in 2004 but it returned to the AU’s agenda in 2009 and 2011 (Omorogbe, 
2019). According to Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016), the idea to provide the ACHPR with a 
criminal chamber originates from the AU’s Assembly’s suggestion to merge the ACHPR with 
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the Court of Justice of the African Union. The Court of Justice of the African Union was 
supposed to be a separate AU court, but to reduce the costs that the maintenance of the two 
courts would bring, the AU’s Assembly decided to merge the two courts into one, leaving the 
Court of Justice of the African Union to exist only on paper. The merger of the two courts 
became official when the AU adopted the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (the Merger Protocol) in 2008, creating the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR) (Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, 2008). Africa’s newest human rights and criminal court would enter into force after 15 
AU Member States had ratified the Merger Protocol. The ACJHR would thereby replace the 
ACHPR and the Court of Justice of the African Union (Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2008). However, Zschirnt (2018) notes that thus far only 
Libya, Benin, Mali, Congo, Burkina Faso and Liberia have ratified the Merger Protocol. The 
six ratifications of the Merger Protocol demonstrate that the majority of the AU Member States 
lack the political will to establish the new Court and to make it operational (Ssenyonjo & 
Nakitto, 2016).  
To complicate matters even more, Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) point out that the AU’s 
Assembly altered the Merger Protocol in 2014 by adopting a new protocol called the Protocol 
on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(Protocol on Amendments). The Protocol on Amendments also known as the Malabo Protocol 
allowed for the establishment of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACJHPR). The ACJHPR is the AU’s fourth judicial institution and is set to replace the 
ACHPR, the Court of Justice of the African Union and the ACJHR.   
Ssenyonjo (2013) explains that the AU amended the Merger Protocol due to the ICC’s 
indictments of Omar al-Bashir and Muammar Gaddafi. At the time of the indictments, both 
were the sitting Presidents of their countries and neither Sudan nor Libya were State Parties to 
the Rome Statute. Therefore, the AU argued that both Presidents were protected by their 
immunity of heads of state. However, the ICC’s Pre-Trail Chamber I (2011) held that 
“customary international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international 
courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the commission of international crimes” (The Prosecutor 
v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir [No. ICC-02/05-01/09], 2011, p. 20), sidestepping the AU’s 
heads of state immunity argument. Disappointed with the Pre-Trail Chamber’s decision, the 
AU Assembly asked the AU Commission to make hast with the implementation of the AU 
Assembly’s decision on the ACJHR being able to prosecute serious international crimes 
committed on African soil (Ssenyonjo, 2013). This led to an amendment on the Merger Protocol 
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which in turn led to the adoption of the Malabo Protocol in 2014. In sum, it can be argued that 
even though the idea to expand the ACHPR’s mandate to include international criminal law 
was already present, the process was fast-tracked due to the rise in tensions between the ICC 
and the AU (Nimigan, 2019; Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016).   
Since the Malabo Protocol is the Protocol on Amendments on the Merger Protocol, the 
Malabo Protocol widens the jurisdiction of the yet to be established ACJHR to encompass 
international and transnational crimes (Nimigan, 2019). Once the Malabo Protocol is ratified 
by 15 or more AU Member States, the ACJHPR is established. The ACJHPR will consist of a 
General Affairs Section, a Human and Peoples’ Rights Section and an International Criminal 
Law Section (Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, 2014).  
As the previous paragraph established, the creation, ratification and operationalisation 
of both human rights and criminal courts in Africa has taken a considerable amount of time. 
The previous paragraph also highlighted that AU Member States often lack the political will to 
establish an African human rights and criminal court and that they are not keen on submitting 
themselves to the jurisdiction of such a court. The ACJHPR is no exception to this. The AU 
Assembly adopted the Malabo Protocol in 2014, however while 15 AU Member States have 
thus far signed the Protocol, none have ratified it (List of Countries which have signed, 
ratified/acceded to the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Union Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2019). The fact that only 15 of the 54 AU Member 
States have signed the Protocol and none have ratified it confirms that it takes a certain amount 
of time to establish a human rights and criminal court in Africa. Furthermore, it confirms that 
AU Member States lack the political will to establish such a court and that they are not keen on 
subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of such a court. This confirmation indicates that AU 
Member States might have reservations about creating an African court that has jurisdiction 
over international crimes and can thus hold them accountable for purportedly committed 
crimes. Furthermore, the confirmations indicate that AU Member States might be content with 
the current legal situation. Either way, both indications are surprising given that there have been 
calls for an African court to try Africans and given that some AU Member States have expressed 
strong sentiments against the ICC (Niang, 2017; Jeangène Vilmer, 2016; Imoedemhe, 2015). 
However, Omorogbe (2019) argues that AU Member States remain committed to the ICC when 
they are not threatened by the ICC’s legal actions. Additionally, both indications oppose 
TWAIL scholars’ viewpoints because these scholars endeavour to create and re-create 
international law from a third world perspective (Gathii, 2019). In short, the small number of 
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AU Member States that joined and acceded to the Malabo Protocol highlights that the ACJHPR 
lacks the necessary political commitment needed from the AU and its Member States and that 
the ACJHPR, just like the ACJHR, currently exists only on paper. It also means that the 
ACHPR, the AU’s first judicial institution, remains the only existing and functioning AU 
human rights court (Zschirnt, 2018), albeit without a mandate that covers the prosecution of 
international crimes.  
 
3.4 Malabo’s institutional and legal concerns 
While the ACJHPR is not yet established or operational, it has attracted significant 
attention from the international community (Nmehielle, 2014). The international community 
has paid attention to the institutional and legal set up of the ACJHPR and has expressed its 
respective concerns about it. The institutional concerns are focused on the scope of the 
ACJHPR’s jurisdiction, its human and capital resources which includes the Court’s funding, 
and its relationship with the ICC. The legal concerns mainly focus on Article 46Abis of the 
Malabo Protocol (Amnesty International, 2017; du Plessis, Maluwa & O’Reilly, 2013; 
Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016).  
One institutional concern is about the scope of the ACJHPR’s jurisdiction. Besides 
human rights law, the ACJHPR has jurisdiction over individuals who have committed crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, the crime of unconstitutional change of government, 
piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, 
trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources and 
the crime of aggression (Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2014). The scope of the ACJHPR’s jurisdiction is immense 
and Nimigan (2019) argues that it is beyond the scope of any other existing international 
criminal justice mechanism. In a report on the Malabo Protocol, Amnesty International (2017) 
confirms that the ACJHPR’s jurisdiction is vast as it covers three areas of international law. In 
addition, the definitions of crimes as set out in the Malabo Protocol have warranted concern. 
Amnesty International (2017) continues to argue that the crimes in the Malabo Protocol are 
vaguely and broadly defined and may raise serious concerns about the adherence with the 
legality principle established under international law. For instance, the description for the crime 
of unconstitutional change of government is unclear and general which could lead to the 
criminalisation of popular protests (Amnesty International, 2017). Another concern about the 
ACJHPR’s jurisdiction is that four of the fourteen crimes fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
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These four crimes are crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and the crime of 
aggression.  
A second institutional concern concerns the ACJHPR’s human and capital resources. 
Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) state that the ACJHPR’s human and capital resources are 
insufficient for the Court’s broad jurisdiction. In its totality, the ACJHPR will have 16 judges 
of which only the President and the Vice-President work full time (Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016). 
Of the 16 judges, nine judges will preside over the International Criminal Law Section, three 
judges will preside over the General Affairs Section and three others will preside over the 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Section (Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2014). In comparison, the AU’s current 
human rights court, the ACHPR, has 11 judges that deal with possible violations of human 
rights law (Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Huma and Peoples’ Rights, 1998). Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) argue 
that the decrease in the number of judges presiding over the Human and Peoples’ Right Section 
suggests that the AU has given prominence to criminal justice matters over human rights 
matters. Hence, Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) argue that an unforeseen consequence of 
providing the ACJHR with a criminal chamber is that violations of human rights appear to be 
less significant if these violations do not lead to international crimes within the proposed Court.  
To add, a comparison can be made regarding the number of ICC judges. As discussed 
above, four out of the fourteen crimes that fall within the ACJHPR’s jurisdiction resonate with 
the ICC’s mandate. The ICC has 18 judges to deal with cases that concern crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide and the crime of aggression (Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 1998). Amnesty’s International report on the Malabo Protocol (2017) 
demonstrates that even the ICC, which has qualified and experienced judges, the know-how 
and the required finances, is at times seriously short on capacity, expertise and resources. 
Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (2016) rightly ask how the ACJHPR with its nine judges that preside 
over the International Criminal Law Section will efficiently and effectively deal with its 
mandate that covers 14 international crimes.  
A similar question can be asked regarding the ACJHPR’s funding. The AU and its 
Member States are expected to fund the Court but it remains uncertain whether they are capable 
of meeting the ACJHPR’s financial needs. Amnesty’s International’s report (2017) highlights 
that the AU struggles to properly finance its own operations, which includes the AU’s human 
rights treaty bodies. Hence, the Merger Protocol. Furthermore, Amnesty International (2017) 
points out that the AU funds less than 25 per cent of its own budget and is reliant on donors for 
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the remaining 75 per cent. Du Plessis, Maluwa and O’Reilly (2013) underscore this by 
highlighting that the ICC’s budget for investigating four international crimes is more than 14 
times that of the ACHPR, which does not have an international criminal law section and has 
approximately double the budget of the AU. Moreover, the ACJHPR places a double financial 
burden on the AU Member States that are also State Parties to the Rome Statute. Having ratified 
both the Rome Statute and the Malabo Protocol, the AU Member States in question are obliged 
to fund both. Given the dire financial situations of many AU Member States this might be too 
great a burden to bear (Nimigan, 2019; Ssenyonjo & Nakitto, 2016).  
The double financial burden, like the overriding mandates, leads to the third and final 
institutional concern about the ACJHPR: its relationship with the ICC. Since the ACJHPR and 
the ICC have jurisdiction over the same crimes and have 33 Members in common, it would be 
expected that the Malabo Protocol mentions its relationship with the ICC. However, du Plessis, 
Maluwa and O’Reilly (2013) note that the Malabo Protocol does not mention a relationship 
with the ICC, nor does it set out a path for the AU Member States to balance their relationship 
with both courts. The fact that the Malabo Protocol does not mention the ICC indicates that the 
AU wants to establish a court that is not linked to the ICC and, potentially a western mind set. 
This is reflected in the AU’s call for non-cooperation with the ICC and its Withdrawal Strategy. 
The omission of the ACJHPR’s relationship with the ICC unnecessarily complicates matters 
for the 33 AU Member States that are also State Parties to the Rome Statute. Amnesty 
International (2017) and du Plessis, Maluwa and O’Reilly (2013) point out that the hierarchy 
between the two courts is unclear. This obscurity remains in a situation where both courts indict 
the same person and order their Members to surrender the person in question to the premises of 
their respective Courts. Would this situation occur, it will be up to the Member States in 
question to decide which obligation it will honour (Amnesty International, 2017). This 
predicament could have been prevented if the AU was open to a relationship with the ICC and 
had mentioned this in the Malabo Protocol.  
The international community’s main legal concern is the immunity of heads of state or 
government. The immunity of these actors is mentioned in Article 46Abis of the Malabo 
Protocol. This Article stipulates that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before the 
Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to 
act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their function, during their tenure 
in office” (Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, 2014, p. 38). Article 46Abis of the Malabo Protocol severely 
decreases the possibilities for the ACJHPR and the ICC to hold AU heads of state or 
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government and senior state officials accountable for the crimes they may have committed. This 
in turn means that Article 46Abis of the Malabo Protocol allows the culture of impunity that is 
present in Africa to continue to exist, dismantling every opportunity for the victims to obtain 
justice (Nimigan, 2019). Amnesty’s International report on the Malabo Protocol (2017) adds 
that Article 46Abis undercuts the ACJHPR’s legitimacy, hinders the fight against impunity in 
Africa and opposes the organisational and founding principles of the AU.  
The immunity of heads of state or government and senior state officials is a delicate 
matter, because international criminal courts do not grant immunity to serving heads of state or 
government and senior state officials of a third state, whereas courts operating under customary 
international law do (Amnesty International, 2017; Nimigan, 2019). The immunity clause is 
also a sensitive matter because once the ACJHPR is established with Article 46Abis in its 
founding treaty, the AU risks losing donors it needs to fund the ACJHPR. Amnesty’s 
International report on the Malabo Protocol (2017) notes that some donors which have always 
financed projects of the AU have already informed the AU that they will not finance the 
ACJHPR because of the immunity clause.  
 
3.5 The AU’s interpretation of international criminal law 
This section examines how the AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias seeks 
to interpret international criminal law. 
 
The AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias seeks to interpret international 
criminal law by Africanising it. This is reflected in the extension of criminal responsibility. 
Where international criminal law restricts responsibility to individual and personal criminal 
responsibility, the Malabo Protocol extends this responsibility to corporations (Nmehielle, 
2014). The extension of criminal responsibility to corporations seems justified, given the roles 
that national and multinational corporations have played in fuelling conflicts in Africa. The 
majority of these conflicts with corporations are over natural resources which, among other 
things, can lead to war (Nmehielle, 2014). Nmehielle (2014) therefore argues that extending 
criminal responsibility to corporations is Africa’s way of making clear that it will no longer 
conduct business the way it used to. Said differently, corporations big or small will no longer 
be able to escape prospective liability because mainstream international criminal law is hesitant 
to widen criminal responsibility to the principles of such corporations (Nmehielle, 2014). 
The AU’s judicial response by Africanising international criminal law is also reflected 
in the ACJHPR’s mandate that covers 14 crimes. Besides the core crimes that are usually 
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included in the jurisdiction of international justice mechanisms, the crimes of terrorism, 
corruption, piracy, unconstitutional change of government, mercenarism, money laundering, 
trafficking in hazardous wastes, trafficking in drugs and trafficking in persons and illicit 
exploitations of natural resources are also included in the ACJHPR’s jurisdiction (Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
2014). As the ACJHPR can be considered an international justice mechanism and because the 
crimes of terrorism, corruption, piracy, unconstitutional change of government, mercenarism, 
money laundering, trafficking in hazardous wastes, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in persons 
and illicit exploitations of natural resources have not yet been part of the mandate of any 
international justice mechanism Nmehielle (2014) argues that the Malabo Protocol produces 
nine new crimes within in the field of international criminal law. Manirakiza (2019) adds that 
the nine new international crimes can be seen as a justification for the AU’s new human rights 
and criminal court, as it permits the ACJHPR to prohibit offences of particular resonances to 
the continent.  
Another example of how the AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias seeks to 
interpret international criminal law is by extending the definition of war crimes to include the 
prohibition of using nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (Jalloh, 2019). 
Jalloh (2019) argues that the objects of this extension are officials of developed nations, because 
no existing African state is known to have nuclear weapons jurisdiction and because there is a 
high probability that such weapons would only be used by non-African states. Jalloh (2019) 
adds that officials of developed nations may be tempted to use such weapons in times of war 
that involve states from their region. Since Africa has witnessed a multitude of foreign 
interventions, the prohibition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction can be 
seen as part of the process with which Africa tries to leave its mark on international criminal 
law. However, mainstream international criminal law has thus far largely resisted Africa’s 
attempts to Africanise international criminal law (Jalloh, 2019).   
Anghie (1999) states that international law is universal as it applies to all countries 
irrespective of their belief systems, distinctive cultures and political organisations. However, 
international law is not universal when it comes to treating belief systems, cultures and political 
organisations equally when there is a preference for the western or European belief system, 
culture and political organisation. International criminal law’s resistance toward Africa’s 
attempts to Africanise its process and its prevailing European point of view confirms that 
international law is not universal. More importantly, it demonstrates that African countries are 
still not in a position to make changes to the established international law and to have it 
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acknowledge their viewpoints. This leads to the conclusion that international law and its system 
might be diverse but not inclusive. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was two-fold: it sought to examine what the AU’s judicial 
response to the ICC’s African bias has been and how this response sought to interpret 
international criminal law. Despite the AU’s previous rejection and the international 
community’s concerns about the institutional and legal set up of the ACJHPR, it can be 
concluded that the AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias has been to provide the 
ACHPR with a criminal chamber that deals with international criminal law. Unfortunately, the 
low number of signatures and ratifications demonstrate that AU Member States lack the 
political will to establish this Court, wherefore it currently exists only on paper. Based on the 
AU’s decision to extend criminal responsibility to corporations and to create nine crimes that 
are new to the field of international criminal law that are specifically in Africa’s interest, it can 
be concluded that the AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s African bias has been to seek an 
‘Africanised’ interpretation of international criminal law. However, international criminal law 
and the system it operates in do not allow for such alterations, as they favour their European 
origins. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis has aimed to answer the main research question: “How has the ICC’s African 
bias affected the judicial system in Africa at regional and international levels?” The answer was 
sought through analysing why the AU and its Member States see the ICC as biased against 
Africa. The answer was also sought through analysing what the AU’s judicial response was and 
how this response has sought to interpret international criminal law. This thesis has employed 
a qualitative research method and has analysed legal, political and academic texts which have 
been approached from an international law and TWAIL perspective.  
 
4.2 The findings 
In chapter one, this thesis presented an overview of the relevant academic literature on 
the ICC’s African bias and the African judicial system. The literature review has pointed out 
that the AU and several of its Member States have become hostile towards the ICC and that this 
hostility is reflected in the relationship between the AU and the ICC. The hostility in this 
relationship is caused by the ICC’s Prosecutor’s decision to open an investigation into the 
situation in Sudan and the issuance of the two arrest warrants against the former President of 
Sudan (Imoedemhe, 2015). Additionally, the literature review has pointed out that although 
international courts and tribunals have arisen and thrived in Africa, they have emerged and 
thrived without a clear understanding of the hierarchy between courts, which courts have 
jurisdiction over what crimes and whether court decisions are enforceable (Fon, 2019). This 
suggests that Africa intents to create an integrated, functioning and hierarchical judicial system 
but that it is in a need of improvement and further development of its judicial system. 
In chapter two, the analysis has exposed that the AU’s criticism directed at the ICC for 
being biased against Africa is not completely correct as it cannot be fully justified by the cases 
under the ICC’s investigations and preliminary examinations. These investigations and 
preliminary examinations show that the ICC’s Prosecutor is also investigating cases in non-
African State Parties. Furthermore, the analysis has exposed that the AU appears to be biased 
in its criticism directed at the ICC. The AU started to accuse the ICC of being biased against 
Africa after the ICC had indicted the former President of Sudan. However, the AU therewith 
neglects that the ICC already had captured a number of African suspects who, unlike the 
President of Sudan, were not an African head of state. 
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In chapter three, the analysis has shown that the AU’s judicial response to the ICC’s 
African bias is to provide the ACHPR, the AU’s current human rights court, with a criminal 
chamber that deals with international criminal law. The analysis has demonstrated that this 
response was accelerated due to the tensions between the AU and the ICC and that it has 
suffered political setbacks. In addition, the analysis has shown that the AU’s judicial response 
to the ICC’s African bias has been to seek an ‘Africanised’ interpretation of international 
criminal law. However, international criminal law and its system do not allow for such changes, 
as it favours its European heritage.   
In light of the above, the thesis concludes that the ICC’s African bias has affected the 
judicial system in Africa at regional and international levels by creating a continental human 
rights and criminal court that has jurisdiction over international criminal law and that replaces 
the AU’s current continental human rights court. However, this new African continental human 
rights and criminal court has caused for the African judicial system to be overreach in terms of 
its jurisdiction over international criminal law. The reasons for this new court’s inability to fulfil 
its mandate stems from the lack of AU’s Member States’ political commitment to properly 
establish and operationalise the Court, the Court’s unsound founding treaty and a lack of human 
and capital resources. Therefore, the thesis can accept its hypothesis that the ICC’s African bias 
has ensured that the judicial system in Africa at regional and international levels is overreached.  
 
 4.3 Further research 
This thesis has contributed to a research gap in the study of the AU’s political and 
institutional influence on its Member States, given the that the AU, as its Member States’ 
representative has a substantial amount of influence.  
The findings of this research could only be exported to the EU, as the foundations of the 
AU and the EU are alike. However, the findings of this thesis cannot be exported to the EU 
because the EU and its Member States do not accuse the ICC of being biased against Europe or 
the EU and do not criticise the ICC’s modus operandi. Additionally, the findings of this thesis 
cannot be generalised to other legal systems because the AU’s legal system is not fully 
developed, whereas others are.  
The AU has urged its Member States to sign and ratify the Malabo Protocol in order for 
the ACJHPR to be established and to be operational. Therefore, further research can be 
conducted as to why the AU Member States have not been forthcoming in signing and ratifying 
the Protocol. Furthermore, further research can be conducted on the ACJHPR’s relationship 
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with the ICC since their mandate and Members partly overlap. Another possibility for further 
research is on the AU’s alleged bias in its criticism towards the ICC’s strong presence in Africa.  
From the outset, it has been unclear whether the Malabo Protocol was adopted to replace 
the ICC, to create an extra judicial layer between Africa and the ICC, or to strengthen the 
African judicial system. From this thesis’ analysis, it can be concluded that the Malabo Protocol 
was adopted to replace the ICC as they both have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, genocide and the crime of aggression. However, the adoption of the Malabo 
Protocol can change into creating an extra layer between Africa and the ICC once the 
relationship between the ACJHPR and the ICC has been established and the hierarchy between 
the two Courts is clear.  
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